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n response to budgetary pressures, many devel-
oping countries have moved (or are considering 
moving) to more targeted poverty alleviation 
programs. A central component of these programs 
involves a transfer to “poor” households, either in 
the form of a cash transfer or an infra-marginal 
subsidized ration. It is useful to separate the direct 
and indirect income (or welfare) effects when 
evaluating the economic impact of such transfers. 
The direct income effects reflect the design of the 
program, i.e., the rules for targeting transfers; these 
are often referred to as first-round effects and are 
captured by partial equilibrium approaches to policy 
evaluation. The indirect effects capture the second-
round income changes brought about by the impact 
of cash transfers and their financing on the level and 
composition of demand and supply. 
  This paper focuses primarily on the indirect 
income effects, more particularly those that are a 
consequence of the need to finance the program do-
mestically. We view this dimension of the program 
to be especially important, since any credible 
poverty alleviation strategy must have underlying it 
a credible financing strategy. The latter, in turn, can 
have important consequences for the level and 
distribution of household incomes and economic 
welfare. 
 
Separating the Indirect 
Effects into Their Three 
Components 
In this section we present a 
general equilibrium model of 
the economy that identifies 
the sources of the welfare im-
pacts of cash transfer pro-
grams. First, there is the 
redistribution effect due to the 
fact that someone must be taxed in order to pay for 
the cost of the transfer program. If high-income 
households bear the brunt of this taxation, and if we 
attribute a social value to a more equal distribution 
of income, then the resulting welfare cost will be 
less than the direct welfare gain from the transfers. 
  Second, there is the reallocation effect, which 
results from the fact that the pattern of demand will 
change if those who finance the program have 
income elasticities of demand different from those 
who receive the transfers. The resulting demand 
changes can have important consequences for gov-
ernment revenues when taxes vary substantially 
across commodities. The welfare effects arise essen-
tially because demand shifts away from (or toward) 
commodities for which demand was previously too 
low, due to their inefficiently high tax rates. 
  Finally, there is the distortionary effect because 
of the need to raise the revenue to finance the pro-
gram through manipulating distortionary commodity 
taxes and subsidies. For example, if the program is 
financed by reducing distortionary subsidies, the 
effect is positive, but if it is financed by increasing 
distortionary taxes, it may be negative. 
  Based on this model, we show how the results 
from a computable general equilibrium model can be 
combined with disaggregated data from household 
surveys to evaluate the full impact of such programs 
on social welfare. We further show how the three 
components can be usefully subsumed within one 
parameter, namely, the adjusted cost of public funds. 
This term represents the 
welfare cost of financing 
the program and should be 
compared to the welfare 
benefit from the transfers 
as captured by the com-
monly used distributional 
characteristic. 
 The adjusted cost of 
public funds is simply the 
standard cost of public 
funds (i.e., the social welfare cost of raising one unit 
of government revenue) multiplied by a parameter 
capturing the tax propensity of households receiving 
transfers.  Whereas the  cost of  public funds  will, in  
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general, vary according to how the program is 
funded and is independent of how the program 
budget is spent, the tax propensity is independent of 
how the program is financed and will, in general, 
vary according to how the budget is spent. If 
households receiving transfers spend their extra 
income disproportionately on taxed (subsidized) 
goods, then this results in a second-round increase 
(decrease) in government revenue captured by a tax 
propensity less (greater) than unity. This means that 
for every unit of income transferred to households, 
the government needs to raise less (more) than one 
unit of revenue through manipulating the existing 
system of taxes and/or subsidies. The tax propensity 
captures the welfare implications of this adjustment. 
 
Applying the Model to an Illustrative Case Study 
We present an illustration of this approach using 
data for Mexico to evaluate the country’s recent 
redirection of their poverty alleviation strategy away 
from universal food subsidies toward targeted cash 
transfers. The model used in this analysis relies on a 
social accounting matrix (SAM) of Mexico for 1996 
that was able to capture differences among the 
regions in terms of production, income, and con-
sumption patterns. Nationally, households are classi-
fied into three income groups, which are distributed 
differently across each of the five regions. We then 
performed various policy simulations and evaluated 
their impacts on welfare. This involves taking the 
indirect welfare impacts from the CGE analysis and 
superimposing them on the household-level data.  
  The basic approach is to compare the social 
costs of raising the revenue needed to finance the 
program (the “cost of public funds”) across 
alternative financing instruments, including the 
actual financing instrument (the elimination of food 
subsidies) and hypothetical alternatives (various 
reforms of the value-added tax system). These costs 
are also compared to program benefits. The analysis 
clearly shows that the move from universal food 
subsidies to targeted transfers has two sources of 
benefit: (1) the introduction of a more distribu-
tionally powerful transfer policy instrument, and 
(2)  the fact that this reduces the need to trade off 
equity objectives against efficiency objectives when 
designing the tax system. More generally, the wel-
fare cost of funding such programs can be substan-
tially lowered when they are accompanied by 
reforms of the tax system. 
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